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I argue that appreciation of the phenomenon of forgetting requires serious attention to
its origins and place in nature. This, in turn, necessitates metaphysical inquiry as well
as empirical backing—a combination likely to be eschewed by psychological ortho-
doxy. But, if we hope to avoid the conceptual vacuity that characterizes too much of
contemporary psychological inquiry (e.g., Klein, 2012, 2014a, 2015a, 2016a), a “big
picture” approach to phenomena of interest is essential. Adopting this investigative
posture turns the “received view” of the relation between remembering and forgetting
on its head: Rather than treated as the result of breakdowns and responses to the
limitations of biologically engineered systems of remembering, forgetting is accorded
elevated status as the driving force behind the evolution of organic systems of
information retention.
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Ignoring the origin of things is always a risky matter.
It is even more risky in an effort that purports to
explain mental events. But that is what has happened in
much of the history of psychology and the philosophy
of mind. (Edelman, 1992, p. 33)
What is forgetting? Although numerous psy-
chological and philosophical treatments have
been on display for over 100 years, these efforts
have been trained almost exclusively on expli-
cation of the mechanisms of forgetting, not on
its nature (for review, see Wixted, 2004).
In this article, I attempt to redress this lacuna.
It is my firm belief that one must know what it
is one is dealing with prior to attempting to
elucidate the specifics (e.g., mechanism, con-
text, and function). But to do so requires more
than a definition. We need to position the phe-
nomenon in the natural world—to map, as best
we can, its origins, location, and interrelations
within the totality of those things we take to
constitute reality. The specifics come later.
In this article I draw on the disciplines of
psychology, philosophy, biology, and evolution
in an attempt to better situate forgetting within
the variegated mosaic that constitutes reality.
Based on my analysis, I conclude that forgetting
assumes two distinct, but deeply interwoven
forms: (a) a presentient instantiation (i.e., phys-
ical forgetting) reflecting an object’s transition
from existence in the present to ontological
oblivion in the past and (b) an experiential form
(i.e., psychological forgetting), which is the
normative outcome of evolution’s “solution” to
problems faced by sentient beings in conse-
quence of physical forgetting. Seen this way,
forgetting is accorded an ontological primacy
denied it by contemporary treatments that view
forgetting as a shortcoming of biological sys-
tems tasked with the preservation of informa-
tion acquired by an organism within its own
lifetime (i.e., ontogenetically).
Because my approach has a clear affiliation
with metaphysics, it will be dismissed by some
(many?) readers. This is unfortunate. As I sur-
vey the psychological landscape from the per-
spective of a person who has been concerned
about the conceptual limitations of our disci-
pline for over 35 years (e.g., Klein, 2012,
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2014a, 2015a, 2016a), I increasingly have been
convinced that real progress requires we step
back from our empirical frenzy and make a
concerted effort to devote serious and sustained
attention to (at least some of) the big questions.
In what follows, I make the case for the need
to (a) consider forgetting in the fullness in
which it is realized in both the physical and
experiential aspects of reality and (b) show how
appreciation of the construct requires we use all
the tools currently available—not just those be-
holden to a particular discipline. Our methods
must be fitted to phenomenon, not phenomenon
to method.
Reality, Change, and Time
Everything flows and nothing stays. (Heraclitus, frag-
ment W20; cited in Brann, 2011, p. 96)
The thesis that “all things are in flux” can be
traced to Pre-Socratic Greek antiquity (c. late
6th or early 5th century BCE; e.g., Cornford,
1941, 1957; Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 1983).
The protagonists divide into two camps (which
continue to shape Western debate about the
nature of reality; e.g., Papa-Grimaldi, 1998;
Toulman & Goodfield, 1965) distinguished pri-
marily by their metaphysical commitments—
that is, those who posit change as the nature of
reality, and those who regard change as the
appearance of an unchanging reality that lays
behind it.
The former view—often attributed to ideas
culled from the fragmentary remains of the writ-
ings of Heraclites (e.g., Brann, 2011; Geldard,
2000)—contends that change is the essential
nature of reality. We may believe the world
consists in stable objects, but in actuality ob-
jects1 (and their relations; i.e., events) are in a
continual state of flux.
The Eleatics (e.g., Parmenides) recognized
change as well, but restricted its purview to
aspects of reality accessible to sensory organs
(i.e., the physical world). On their view, change
is the appearance of motion derived from un-
changing, eternal forms that transcend what is
accessible to experience (e.g., Cornford, 1957;
Geldard, 2007; de Vivar, 2006).
It is important to note that despite differences
in assignment of ontological status, both camps
accord change a central role in the physical
world (interestingly, an essential teaching of
Buddhism is the doctrine of Impermanence—
the idea that all things, without exception, un-
dergo continual change; e.g., Albahari, 2006;
Harvey, 2012; Siderits, 2019). Those champi-
oning the Heraclitean perspective hold that all
reality is in an unceasing state of flux. Conse-
quently, constituents of the whole (e.g., the
physical world) must, of logical necessity, also
be in constant motion.
The Eleatic school, in contrast, acknowledges
change in the physical world, but argues that
change, though derived from reality, is not part
of reality per se. However, any account of real-
ity that fails to make room for “appearance”
opens itself to serious objections (e.g., Broad,
1925; Dewey, 1958; Klein, 2014a; Meixner,
2008; Plato, 2002; Strawson, 2009; Wallace,
2003). Appearances are experiences, and expe-
riences are happenings realized in a subcategory
of physical objects (i.e., the brains of sentient
creatures2).
A Note on the Word “Real” and Claims
About Reality
The question of whether some X is real pre-
supposes that X has ontological status—for ex-
ample, as real, imaginary, and so forth. An
appearance has the same mode of being as any
mental image (genuine or illusory) and thus is
real in the same sense. As Earle noted, “the
image or pure datum which the productive
imagination forms is not anything imaginary
itself. It is actual and a present determination of
any sensorium” (Earle, 1955, p. 146). Appear-
ances are counted among the experiential as-
pects of reality (e.g., Broad, 1925; Crane, 2013;
1 By “objects,” I refer to particles, their groupings and
relations, characterized by an ontological essence that ren-
ders them independent of the descriptions they are given
(i.e., natural kinds; e.g., Quine, 1969). Although not exhaus-
tive of reality (e.g., experiential aspects of reality), they are
necessary constituents.
2 Sentience is taken to consist in an internal state in which
information—typically, though not necessarily, about the
environment—comes to have a subjective feel or qualia
(e.g., Nagel, 1974). It is useful to discriminate sentience
from sensing. An organism may have the capacity to make
sensory-based discriminations absent any phenomenologi-
cal character (e.g., most plant life can respond to at least
some external stimuli. But it is unlikely they have an ac-
companying subjective experience of the stimulus). Sensing
is more highly developed in animals than in plants, reflect-
ing processing requirements necessitated by motility.
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Harris, 1988; Klein, 2012, 2014a; Strawson,
2009).3,4
The Eleatic postulate that “appearance” is
illusory and thus cannot be “real” continues to
enjoy wide currency among contemporary psy-
chologists (for reviews, see Klein, 2012, 2014a,
2016a). Much of this appeal, I believe, trades on
a failure to appreciate two different senses of
the word “real.” An appearance is “real” in the
first sense when the word signifies that some X
is what it seems to be. For instance, the appear-
ance of X (e.g., as a Rolex watch) is “real” if it
can be shown that X is a genuine exemplar of
the category “Rolex watches.” Conversely, the
Müller-Lyer illusion—in which two line seg-
ments of objectively equal measure appear to
differ in size as a function of the visual context
in which they are embedded—is “unreal” in
consequence of portraying a state of affairs de-
monstrably untrue.
In its second sense (the one I use in this
article), the appearance of X is “real” if and
only if it is isomorphic with an aspect of nature
that exists independent of any categorizations or
descriptions it may receive (e.g., Hacking,
1992; Klein, 2018). Appearances (whether illu-
sory or not) are actual events taking place in
actual objects (i.e., sentient beings). As such,
they are woven into the fabric of reality (Note:
On this view, the material monist attempt to
maintain metaphysical hegemony by dismissing
subjective experience as “mere appearance” is
self-refuting).
In short, the question of whether an appear-
ance is a veridical portrayal of a datum (e.g., a
Rolex watch) is entirely separate from whether
an appearance is part of reality. Although our
interpretation of an appearance may be inaccu-
rate, we cannot be mistaken in claiming that
appearance, per se, exists as an aspect of real-
ity.5
Does an Object Remain a Part of Physical
Reality When It Becomes Past?
In what follows, I adopt the widely held view
(though not without critics; e.g., Barbour, 2000;
McTaggart, 1908; Rochelle, 1998) that objects
and events can be situated within a tripartite
classification of time as past, present, or future.
By this scheme (often referred to as McTag-
gart’s A-Series), the temporal identity of an
object varies as a function of its location within
the temporal manifold: Objects that once were
future will become present and what is present
will recede into the past.
It is not my intention to offer a knock-down
argument for or against the existence of an
object as a function of its temporal identity. I
cannot do so and, as best I can tell, neither can
anyone else. Nor is it my goal to address all of
the philosophical positions that have been mar-
shaled in support or refutation of this ontologi-
cal thesis (i.e., the reality of an object varies as
a function of its temporal position).6 Treatment
would take us far afield, and I seriously doubt a
satisfactory resolution could reasonably be ex-
pected. Suffice it to say that, to date, there are
no unassailable facts about the ontological sta-
tus of objects in time.
3 On some reckonings (e.g., Plato, 2002), experiential
reality occupies a lower level within a hierarchy of grada-
tions of reality—though not all abide by this assertion of
metaphysical inferiority (e.g., Berkeley, 1710/2003; Bohm,
1980; Dewey, 1958; Meixner, 2008; Nagel, 2012; Popper,
1994; Wallace, 2003).
4 The Eleatic view of change as “mere appearance” implies
the existence of a sentience for whom the appearance appears.
On the other hand, the idea that prior to the emergence of
sentient beings physical reality existed in a state of perpetual
stasis is completely at odds with what is known about the
evolution of the universe (e.g., Guth, 1997; Jeans, 1943).
Although these seemingly disjunctive implications cannot eas-
ily be reconciled, rather than ignore the Eleatics I view pre-
sentient change (whether real or apparent) as a necessary
condition of physical, but not transcendental, reality.
5 Dewey (1958) made a persuasive case for the reality of
appearance: Reality
is what existence would be if our reasonably justified
preferences were so completely established in nature as
to exhaust and define its entire being . . . what is left
over (and since trouble, struggle, conflict and error still
empirically exist, something is left over), being ex-
cluded by definition from full reality is assigned a
lower grade or order of being . . . an order variously
called illusion, mortal mind or the merely empirical
against what truly is . . . we have two separate realms
of being . . . a classificatory device has been introduced
by which the two traits have been torn apart, one of
them being labeled reality and the other appearance. (p.
54, emphasis in original)
6 For the interested reader, contemporary treatments of
this thesis can be found in the work of Barbour (2000), Gold
(1967), Loizou (1986), Lockwood (2005), McTaggart
(1908); McLure (2005), Newton-Smith (1980), Rochelle
(1998), Seddon (1987), Tallis (2017), Turetzky (1998),
Whitrow (1980), and Yourgrau (2005).
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What I will argue is that on arrival in the past,
an object stops being a part of physical reality
(e.g., Saint Augustine of Hippo, 1997; Coope,
2005; Hussey, 1993; Kant, 1998; Lieb, 1991;
Mead, 2002; Turetzky, 1998; Whitehead, 1929;
but see Barbour, 2000; Loizou, 1986). There are
a number of ways the case can be made. In
keeping with the theme of this section—that is,
“change in relation to reality”—I offer the fol-
lowing:
1. Physical reality consists in its entirety of
objects in a continual state of real or ap-
parent change (cf., Heraclitus, Par-
menides, Plato).
2. Change takes place in the present (e.g.,
Coope, 2005; Mead, 2002; Tallis, 2008).7
3. On retreating from the present, an object
ceases to undergo further change (e.g.,
Fischer, 1994; Lieb, 1991; Seddon, 1987).
4. Once past, an object falls into ontological
oblivion (Points 1 and 3).
By this account, on passing from present to
past an object is rendered incapable of change.
Because change is a necessary condition for
physical existence, once past, an object forfeits
its claim to being part of physical reality (this
loss of being is consistent with the conserva-
tions laws of physics).
In the next section I argue that the past,
having no members, either is nonexistent or, if
it “exists,” does so as an empty set (i.e., a set
containing no elements).8 In support, I first ex-
amine the present and future branches of the
A-Series. After showing that both have a legit-
imate claim to being temporal modes of reality,
I argue that the same criteria applied to the past
show it to be a temporal chimera.
Past, Present, and Future as Temporal
Modalities in the Presentient World
Although there is considerable agreement
that the present is a temporal mode of reality
(e.g., Hussey, 1993; Klein, 2013; Lieb, 1991;
Le Poidevin, 2003; Mead, 2002; Seddon, 1987;
Turetzky, 1998; Whitehead, 1929), the status of
the past and future has generated considerable
debate (e.g., Faye, 1989; Gallagher, 1998; Har-
ris, 1988; Loizou, 1986; McTaggart, 1908;
Newton-Smith, 1980; Rochelle, 1998). What-
ever the ultimate solution, I believe such ques-
tions most fruitfully are pursued from the Aris-
totelian perspective that facts about time
ultimately are reducible facts about the behavior
of objects in time (e.g., Coope, 2005; Harris,
1988; Hussey, 1993). From this vantage point,
questions about tensed reality amount to
whether change is realized in a particular tem-
poral mode.9,10
To determine of any object X that it is chang-
ing (at least) two conditions must be met. First,
X currently must be undergoing some activity.
Second, there is some endpoint toward which
this activity is directed (e.g., Kant, 1998).
Change thus assumes a connection between the
object of change and that into which it changes.
Seen this way, change occurs in a continuum
consisting in two distinguishable modes—it ex-
tends forward from the present toward its con-
tinuation in the future.
Both formal and phenomenological analyses
of the present reveal it to consist in an endless
succession of “nows” transitioning (virtually in-
stantaneously) to “nexts”: What is present is
inextricably entangled with what will be present
(e.g., Dolev, 2007; Faye, 1989; Harris, 1988;
Husserl, 1964; Klein, 2013; Lieb, 1991; Loizou,
1986; Rochelle, 1998; Seddon, 1987). The pres-
ent and future can be likened to the intersection
on a Venn diagram where an objects’ potential
for and realization of change overlap.
One may take issue with this analysis, argu-
ing that what “will be” is possibility rather than
reality. But a possibility is not nothing. It is
something. And that something is determinate,
grounded in the determinate character of the
existent (e.g., Earle, 1955; Harris, 1988; Lieb,
1991). As Earle (1955, p. 149) observed, what
“will be” is inherently part of “the actual be-
7 There also is an argument to be made (see the next
section) that change extends into the future (e.g., Kant,
1998).
8 Whether the past is taken to be unreal, or real but devoid
of content, makes little difference to my thesis that prior to
the appearance of sentient beings, the past had no partici-
patory role in physical reality.
9 A reduction, in the sense used here, is an explanation of
facts of one kind in terms of facts of another kind. In the
present case, facts about temporal modality are understood
in terms of facts about the behavior of objects.
10 Whether the reality of time is reducible to facts about
objects in time is a question of longstanding interest to
theoreticians concerned with whether there can be time
absent change. Discussions can be found in Coope (2005)
and Newton-Smith (1980).
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cause it is the possibility of the actual, what is,
and not of nothing . . . the possibilities of
something are also something.” Taken this way,
the present and future both qualify as modes of
temporal reality in virtue being parts of a shared
activity.11
The past, like the future, is conterminous with
the present (e.g., Dolev, 2007; Gallagher, 1998;
Harris, 1988; Husserl, 1964; Lieb, 1991; Sed-
don, 1987). However, unlike the future, an ob-
ject no longer present has relinquished its claim
to physical reality (see previous section). Hav-
ing no members, the past cannot host change—
actual or apparent (e.g., Dolev, 2007; Lieb,
1991; Mead, 2002; Seddon, 1987). It is disqual-
ified as a mode of temporal reality (but see
Newton-Smith, 1980, for a dissenting opinion).
In sum, the fruits of change are sown in the
future, realized in the present, and finalized in the
past (where finalization signifies stasis). Given
that the relation between time and reality ulti-
mately are reducible to whether change is realized
in a particular mode of temporality (e.g., Coope,
2005; Hussey, 1993), this suggests that physical
reality is restricted to the “now and the next.”
What happened “before” is frozen into nonexis-
tence.12 The presentient past is nothing, and a
nothing cannot refer to something (a subtle, but
very important, perspective to emerge from this
analysis is that physical reality moves toward the
future, not away from the past).
A Brief Summing Up: The Nature of
Forgetting in Presentient Reality
Presentient reality consists in physical ob-
jects undergoing continual change. Change
reaches forward from the present to its contin-
uance in the future. It makes no reference to its
origins. Indeed, no reference can be made: Once
change has been actualized, the object enters a
state of stasis and thus concedes any claim to
physical reality. What once was now is past and
what is past is no more.
Expressed in terms of temporal modality, all
that is physically real is real in “a now extending
into a next.” On receding from the present, an
object relinquishes its status as a thing, event, or a
possibility. This ontological elimination signifies
the all-abiding, eternal loss of objects that once
were elements of reality. Taken this way, the past
can be seen as the perpetual amnestic state of
physical reality: Presentient physical reality con-
tinually and completely forgets itself.
One might take issue with the claim that the
past has no purchase on physical reality by
arguing that surviving records (e.g., geological
strata,13 fossilized remains, growth rings) are
reality’s recognition of the past as the formative
background of current change. But records exist
only in the present. To infer that what is present
is a record of what once was requires a sen-
tience capable of making that inductive leap.
Sentience and the Problem of Knowledge
Our knowledge14 of the physical world de-
pends—wholly or in combination with a priori
principles (Kant, 1998)—on our experience of
the objects with which it is populated (e.g.,
Broad, 1925; Russell, 1912/1999, 1913/1992;
Tallis, 2008). But, to serve as the basis for
knowledge, an object must appear sufficiently
consistent to permit its identification and re-
identification (e.g., Brennan, 1988; Mead, 2002;
Sider, 2001). We must be able to attribute prop-
erties (e.g., size, shape, color, etc.) in virtue of
which the object acquires its identity.
Sentient beings are bathed in continual flux.
This creates a problem for creatures whose evo-
lutionary viability depends, in large part, on the
capacity to acquire knowledge of their sur-
roundings. It is very difficult to assign individ-
uating properties to a moving target. It is im-
possible to do so for objects that have entered
ontological oblivion.
11 That the future consists in possibility rather than actu-
ality (e.g., Lieb, 1991; Lockwood, 2005; Tallis, 2008) does
not undermine its claim to temporal existence. Only one
possibility will be actualized in the present. So long as that
actualization is not inconsistent with change currently tak-
ing place, future indeterminacy is an epistemological—not
an ontological—problem.
12 Although the notion of “creating a non-existent”
sounds like an oxymoron, it is not. For instance, the thought
of a unicorn is real even if unicorns are not (for discussion,
see Crane, 2013).
13 A geological stratum is a layer of rock with internal
characteristics that distinguishes it from contiguous layers.
The layers typically are situated one upon another and are
assumed to have been positioned over time by natural
processes.
14 In this article, the term knowledge is not to be taken in
its philosophical sense as true, justified belief. Rather, it is
used to denote any ontologically acquired information op-
erated on by conscious or unconscious processes in the
service of thought, decisions and behavior.
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Put differently, a sentient creature’s ability to
know about and engage with objects in its en-
vironment is a direct function of an object’s
expectedness (e.g., Spencer Brown, 1957). It
only is when an object does what we expect it to
do that it becomes a knowable aspect of reality.
Expectedness, in turn, requires that what we
observe does not change— or changes very
slowly (where “slowly” refers to the temporal
resolution of our sensory systems).
But, expectedness is inversely related to rate
of change. If something—a rock, a rat, a person,
a planet—changes too rapidly, or too often, we
find it difficult to develop expectations. In con-
sequence, the object’s status as an identifiable
(and potentially predictable) part of the percep-
tible world is undermined.
For example, if a person changed her size,
shape, color, physical characteristics, psychologi-
cal dispositions, and so forth each time we en-
countered her, we would be unable to name, much
less know her. In the absence of such knowledge,
we would be unable to formulate expectations
(e.g., who she is, how she is likely to behave). Our
ability to imbue (the appearance of) stasis on
objects undergoing continual change allows us to
form expectations about their properties and
causal potencies. This, in turn, provides us with
knowledge of what they are and how they are
predisposed to act. However, object fixation is the
exclusive province of the past. Accordingly, an
organism’s opportunity to stabilize sensation par-
adoxically is limited to those aspects of reality
engulfed in ontological amnesia.
These requirements appear incommensurate.
Because physical reality is in a state of contin-
ual flux, it is only on transitioning to the past
that an object acquires the stability required for
identification. But the past, in virtue of being
fixed, is physically unreal. Therein lies the prob-
lem. To permit identification, an object’s expe-
rienced presentation must be (reasonably) con-
stant. But such uniformity is found only after
the object has become past, at which point it no
longer is available for identification.
Sentient creatures face a paradox. If reality is to
be known, the knower must find a way to stabilize
the objects of the physical world. But, objects in
stasis no longer are part of physical reality and
thus no longer available to be known. What was
needed was a means of experientially stabilizing
the objects of physical reality, thereby escaping
existential purging attending transition to the past.
Addressing the Problem:
A Biological Intervention
The ability to transform physical flux into rel-
atively stable15 mental representations is evolu-
tion’s answer to this paradox.16 In the early phase
of organic evolution, sentient creatures had re-
course only to rudimentary mechanisms of stim-
ulus stabilization (e.g., perceptual constancies,
sensitization, stimulus generalization) to help nav-
igate the chaotic world of sensory variation (e.g.,
Eccles, 1989; Kaufman, 1974; Mostofsky, 1965;
Walsh & Kulikowski, 1998; Young, 1976). Such
mechanisms, being largely reflexive, were not
able to support sustained, flexible and tailored
engagement with the environment (e.g., Klein,
Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002).
Remembering17 solved this problem by sup-
plying the appropriate neural systems with
knowledge for use in coordinating responses to
internal and external contingencies. The pri-
15 It is important to recognize that “stabilization,” applied to
experiential reality, is a relative term. More, remembered contents
are not faithful transcriptions of the objects and events that gave
rise to them; rather, they are approximate reconstructions that knit
past experience with current beliefs, motives, and even external
suggestions (e.g., Klein, 2014b). In short, remembering is con-
structive rather than reproductive. This idea, which is common-
place among modern researchers, traces to work by Münsterberg
(1909) and Bartlett (1932).
16 I acknowledge that my distinction between the flux of the
physical and the stability of the sentient reality is an implicit jab at
the physical monism of psychological orthodoxy. In Klein (2012,
2014a, 2014c, 2015a, 2016a) I make the case for remaining open
to the possibility that “reality” in its fullness is constituted by a
plurality of aspects that likely share different ontological commit-
ments (see also Earle, 1955; James, 1909/1996; Meixner, 2005).
Perhaps a “finished” physicalism will be capable of explaining the
mind without having to treat its subjective aspects as epiphenom-
enal (e.g., Russell, 1921/1949). But we do not at present know
what a fully matured physics might consist in. And, for a number
of reasons (e.g., Klein, 2014a, 2016a) we never may. Accordingly,
tethering our understanding of mind to a future version of phys-
icalism requires we accept a promissory note with no way of
envisaging the conditions of the note.
17 Throughout this article I will use the word remember rather
than memory. Although virtually all academics take the two to be
synonyms (Klein, 2018), I draw a sharp distinction: Remembering
is the process by which stored knowledge is made available to
consciousness. Memory is only one of many potential products of
remembering. What separates memory from other mental states
(e.g., knowledge, belief, imagination) is that the remembered
material is accompanied by an immediate, nonanalytic feeling that
my current mental state is coterminous with a state of affairs I
experienced in my past. Because little in the present article rides
on this distinction, I will not rehearse my reasons for these claims
here. For those interested, my arguments can be found in Klein
(2015b) or Klein (2018).
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mary mechanism by which this is accomplished
is consolidation—that is, the progressive neural
stabilization of ontogenetically acquired infor-
mation (e.g., Dudai, 2004; McGaugh, 2000; Na-
del & Moscovitch, 1997; Polster, Nadel, &
Schacter, 1991; Squire & Alvarez, 1995). By
capturing the world of change in representa-
tional formats, the organism can know about—
rather than simply be influenced by—its physi-
cal surroundings.
But a representational structure, no matter
how stable or complex, is little more than a
pointless appendage unless accompanied by
mechanisms capable of making it available to
the right systems at the right times. And this is
exactly what a system of remembering accom-
plishes (for discussion see Klein et al., 2002).
Remembering can thus be viewed as the sen-
tient counterweight to physical reality’s onto-
logical amnesia (but, as we will see in the next
section, remembering creates its own forms of
forgetting).
Because mental processes do not leave fossil
records, it is difficult, if impossible, to know
when remembering was added to the biological
tool kit. Some paleontological clues can, how-
ever, help guide informed speculation. The or-
igin of vertebrate systems of remembering is
hypothesized to date to the Cambrian “explo-
sion” (e.g., Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2007, 2010).
This period, which spanned approximately 25
million years beginning around 545 million
years ago, is considered one of the most signif-
icant transitions in evolutionary history (e.g.,
Marshall, 2006; Vallentine, 2004): In a short
time (by evolutionary standards) essentially all
animal phyla first appear in the fossil records
(e.g., Vallentine, 2002).
The cause of the Cambrian “explosion” is the
subject of considerable debate (e.g., changes in
the oxygenation or temperature of the biotic
environment; for discussion, see Marshall,
2006; Vallentine, 2004). One well-regarded the-
ory is that the ecological and morphological
diversification during the “explosion” stemmed
from a genetic reorganization of the central
nervous system that occurred in parallel among
several groups of metazoans (e.g., Cabej, 2008;
Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2007).
Of significance for our discussion, this reor-
ganization is hypothesized to have resulted in
the development of neural processes capable of
supporting nascent forms of remembering (for
review, see Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2007). This
made possible numerous behavioral adjust-
ments during an animal’s lifetime, which, in
turn, set the stage for a variety of survival-
relevant adaptations. Organisms capable of re-
membering are thus gifted with enormous se-
lective advantages (for discussions, see Boyer,
2009; Klein et al., 2002; Nairne, 2005; Tulving,
2005).
Forgetting as an Aspect of
Psychobiological Reality
Remembering is the sentient realization of a
biological system whose organization was
shaped by recurrent problems faced in the en-
vironment of evolutionary adaptation (e.g.,
Glenberg, 1997; Klein, 2007, 2013, 2014b;
Klein et al., 2002; Nairne, 2005; Sherry &
Schacter, 1987). One useful way to study a
biological system is to adopt an adaptationist
perspective (e.g., Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby,
1992; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Klein et al.,
2002). On this account, remembering can be
seen as part of an organic machine designed by
natural selection to use knowledge acquired in
an animal’s past to coordinate its behavior in the
present and future (e.g., Klein et al., 2002;
Klein, 2007, 2016b).
But, like any machine, successful operation
involves the complex interplay of finely coor-
dinated parts. Consequently, the architecture
supporting remembering is subject to a variety
of structural limitations (e.g., inhibition, inter-
ference, decay) and real-time vulnerabilities
(e.g., componential fatigue, physical insult, psy-
cho-social stress).
More than a century of research has made
clear that failure is the normative outcome on
tests of retention (e.g., Ballard, 1913; Brown,
1923). For example, in multitrial tests of free
recall (e.g., Klein, Loftus, Kihlstrom, & Aseron,
1989; Tulving, 1964), investigators unfailingly
find that items not remembered on one trial may
be remembered on another (item gain), whereas
items remembered on previous trials may not be
remembered on later attempts (item loss). Im-
portantly—with the exception of highly unusual
circumstances (e.g., hypermnestic recall;
e.g.,Erdelyi, 1984)—item losses exceed gains
(for reviews see Payne, 1987; Roediger & Chal-
lis, 1989).
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More generally, a simple tally of “informa-
tion presented minus information remembered”
reveals that in virtually every investigation of
“memory,”18 retention failure eclipses (often by
a substantial margin) retention success. This
disparity is on display in such diverse phenom-
ena as encoding specificity (e.g., Tulving &
Thomson, 1973), mood state dependence (e.g.,
Bower, 1981), free recall (e.g., Tulving, 1964),
repeated reproduction (e.g., Bartlett, 1932), se-
rial position effects (e.g., Murdock, 1962), the
temporal gradient of recollection (e.g., Ribot,
1882), the formation of semantic abstractions
(e.g., Caramazza, 2000), encoding task variabil-
ity (e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 1972), and the
method of savings (e.g., Ebbinghaus, 1885/
1913).
Outside the lab, the gap between remember-
ing and forgetting is even more pronounced
(e.g., Brewer, 1994; Neisser, 1981; Rubin,
1996; Thompson et al., 1998). Consider life
experience. Most of the information remem-
bered minutes, days, weeks, or months follow-
ing its occurrence will be lost as life pushes
forward. What remains is a mere pittance of
what once readily was accessible (e.g., Galton,
1879; Jansari & Parkin, 1996; Linton, 1975).
For example, try to provide a reasonably de-
tailed account of the events that transpired on a
particular day during the previous month. Al-
though this likely presented little problem at
day’s end, the undertaking now is formidable.
And it will be even more demanding next month
(e.g., Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974; Thompson,
1982). Cohen (1985) goes so far as to elevate
this phenomenon to a general law of remember-
ing: “The longer something has been retained in
memory, the less the likelihood that it will be
remembered” (p. 253).19
In summary, a striking irony about biologi-
cally engineered systems for remembering is
that their modus operandi, more often than not,
is retention failure. Yet, despite this stark asym-
metry, psychologists disproportionately focus
investigative effort on explicating the system’s
achievements. Case in point: While hundreds of
scholarly volumes have devoted the topic of
remembering (many of which inhabit my book-
shelves), to date the lone offerings dedicated
exclusively to the topic of forgetting consist in
one edited volume (Della Sala, 2010) and a
single-authored monograph (Draaisma, 2015).
Why the Second Tier Status?
A principle reason for this neglect is that
forgetting typically is seen as symptomatic of
imperfections in the design of systems tasked
with remembering. This sentiment is clearly
articulated by Nairne and Pandeirada (2008, p.
179), who observed that most for academics
forgetting is considered “a breakdown in an
otherwise efficient mental capacity” (see also
Cubelli, 2010; Michaelian, 2011; Roediger,
Weinstein, & Agarwal, 2010; Schacter, 2001).
Assuming scholarly effort most profitably is
trained on what a machine was designed to
accomplish (e.g., Klein, 2014b; Klein et al.,
2002), it would seem counterproductive to treat
the unwanted residue of a system’s vulnerabil-
ities as the primary target of investigative in-
quiry. And, although system failures are not
without theoretic and practical value (e.g., the
clinical amnesias; for review, see Rosenbaum,
Murphy, & Rich, 2011), they often are seen as
existentially derivative in virtue of being struc-
turally parasitic on mechanisms governing how
the system is supposed to operate (but see
Freud, 1940).
In short, most investigators accord the phenom-
enon of forgetting a lower or secondary status.
However—as I hope I have made clear—in so
doing, scholars unintentionally undercut the very
factor that gives their conceptual offerings point
and bearing. Rather than a design flaw in a system
biologically engineered to counterbalance the per-
sistent loss of physical reality, forgetting was the
driving force behind natural selection’s “solution”
to the problem of change and knowledge. Forget-
ting is anything but a second-class citizen.
Conclusion and Final Thoughts
On the view presented here, ontological elim-
ination (i.e., presentient forgetting) is one of the
18 For an explanation of the scare quotes flanking the
word memory, see Footnote 17.
19 Importantly—despite assertions to the contrary (e.g.,
Frise, 2018)—the evidence makes abundantly clear that
forgetting need not, and typical does not, require a concom-
itant intention to retrieve. In both clinical (e.g., Prigatano &
Schacter, 1991; Talland & Waugh, 1969) and nonclinical
(e.g., Brewer, 1994; Engel, 1999; Neisser, 1981) conditions,
forgetting commonly takes the form of a failure to remem-
ber things that ordinarily would have been automatically
evoked in and by context.
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two fundamental modes of physical reality (the
other being ontological existence). Indeed, the
need to stabilize reality prior to its descent into
oblivion was the impetus for the evolution of
sentient, carbon-based systems for remember-
ing. (Although not the place for a comprehen-
sive treatment of conceptual parallels, it is
worth noting that the “problem of change” is
also the crux of Gestalt psychology’s view on
changing sensations vis a vis perceptual con-
stancies and on learning vis a vis forgetting;
e.g., Köhler, 1947.)20
More specifically, forgetting is the loss of
that which once had physical and/or psycholog-
ical presence. In physical reality, forgetting is
the irrevocable loss of the objects and their
relations in consequence of their recession into
the past. In experiential reality, forgetting as-
sumes an additional articulation—the tempo-
rary or permanent loss of access to information
acquired by naturally selected systems of re-
membering.
This conception is at odds with prevailing
treatments of forgetting as a deficiency in the
apparatus of remembering (e.g., Nairne & Pan-
deirada, 2008; Schacter, 2001; Tulving, 1974;
Underwood, 1966). This deflationary view is
nicely captured by Bernecker (2008), who con-
cluded “forgetting can be adequately defined
only by way of appeal to the notion of remem-
bering” (p. 27; emphasis added).
My reconceptualization turns this on its head.
Rather than seen as the unwelcome byproduct
of an organic machine tasked with remembering
(while this characterizes some types of forget-
ting, it is relatively small part of the big picture),
forgetting is accorded ontological primacy. It is
the aspect of reality that necessitated the evolu-
tion of biologically engineered systems de-
signed to minimize its occurrence. But nature’s
“solutions” seldom, if ever, attain perfection
(e.g., Williams, 1966). Ironically, the principle
commodity of the mechanisms of retention is
forgetting.
Any proposal, no matter how carefully
crafted, runs the risk of being an exercise in
conceptual hair splitting unless it can be shown
to make a positive difference in how we ap-
proach our target of inquiry. The possibility
thus exists that my revisionary discourse on the
ontological status of remembering and forget-
ting amounts to “a difference that does not make
a difference.”
Although it is beyond the scope of this article
to provide a comprehensive account of the im-
plications of my reconceptualization for the
workings of the mind, I do want to briefly
discuss its ramifications for recent attempts to
habilitate forgetting by treating it as an evolved
solution to what commonly is referred to as
“information clutter” (e.g., Anderson &
Schooler, 1991; Michaelian, 2011; Nairne &
Pandeirada, 2008; Roediger et al., 2010). The
basic idea is that the amount of information in
storage generally exceeds its practical function-
ality (a variant of the “clutter” problem invokes
storage limitations, but this assertion lacks both
conceptual and empirical warrant). Accord-
ingly, so the argument goes, mechanisms must
have evolved to help the organism deal with
mental clutter.
The prototypical example is the problem of
“where I last left X” (e.g., reading glasses, cof-
fee cup, house keys). Absent a mechanism for
updating (e.g., Bjork, 1978) and/or discarding
(e.g., Michaelian, 2011) clutter, search engines
tasked with accessing task-relevant data would
be inundated with information of questionable
value (e.g., remembering the previous 20 places
I parked my car would be more confusing than
beneficial to locating its current location).
Although the benefits of clutter removal seem
clear, the idea that evolution designed mecha-
nisms for this purpose is far from compelling.
First, identification of an item as “clutter” re-
quires ways for the system to determine which
elements in storage are in need of updating or
assignment to the scrap heap. How might this be
accomplished?
Numerous possibilities have been tendered,
including, but not limited to, recency and regu-
larity of use, predictive value, and personal rel-
evance. But each is easily defeasible (e.g., one’s
social security number or the date of mom’s
90th birthday may be have considerable per-
sonal value despite lack of recent access; deter-
mining predictive import assumes the coopera-
tion of sophisticated mechanisms capable of
making stochastic decisions about events that
may never transpire).
Because evolutionary adaptations seldom, if
ever, are optimal (e.g., the shared opening to the
20 I am grateful to Professor Robert Kunzendorf’ for this
important observation.
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esophagus and trachea in many mammals), per-
haps probative indices are better considered
heuristic than definitive. Even allowing such
latitude, the stubborn fact remains that organ-
isms tend not to expend energy and resources on
adaptive solutions to problems whose resolution
is inherent in the workings of nature. For exam-
ple, the existence of gravitational force makes it
pointless to evolve mechanisms that enable an
organism to maintain contact with terra firma.
We can, and do, evolve systems for countering
the effects of gravity (e.g., the semicircular
ducts of the inner ear evolved to detect rota-
tional movement and maintain balance), but we
do not need systems to enable gravitational ef-
fects per se.
Forgetting is an unceasing aspect of exis-
tence: The vast majority of the knowledge we
acquire suffers a common fate—its eventual,
often permanent, loss. There is no need to
evolve mechanisms to enable its occurrence.
One reason that examples of the purported ben-
efits of forgetting seem compelling is because
they are cherry picked expressly for that pur-
pose. In point of fact, the locations of most
objects we encounter will be forgotten (often
much sooner than desired) regardless of
whether there is value in so doing.
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